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Abstract: The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [1] is an open standard specifying a 
technical method to prevent sender address forgery. This technique requires network 
administrators to create SPF records for their domains. A philosophic issue, which 
may limit the deployment of SPF, is that in order to use SPF, a network administrator 
needs to configure local DNS; but others, not himself, will take benefits from that 
configuration. Therefore, we proposed the Dynamic Sender Policy Framework 
(DSPF) approach, in which, the legal IP addresses of servers which send emails are 
collected and provided by a third-party. The database of SPF records can be updated 
automatically and can also be used among other email servers and email gateways. 
Using DSPF, clients may check the SPF records without any extra configuration of 
their DNS. Results showed that the system is able to filter 98% spam and 100% 
phishing. Collecting and updating processes of the database are described. Factors that 
influence database’s performance are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
The amount of unsolicited commercial email (spam), and more importantly, the fraction of 
email which is spam, has risen dramatically in the last few years.  Recently, a study has shown 
that 52% of email users say spam has made them less trusting of email, and 25% say that the 
volume of spam has reduced their usage of email [5]. A calculation about Hanoi University 
(HANU)’s case shows that the email server in HANU has to handle 15000 emails per day, 80% 
of which, i.e. 12000 emails, are spam. If a user needs 15 seconds to process an email, including 
download, read and delete, HANU staff have to spend 50 hours per day to process spam. It 
results in 1.500.000 VND in economic loss each day. 
 This crisis has prompted proposals for a broad spectrum of potential solutions, ranging from 
the design of more efficient anti-spam software tools to calls for anti-spam laws. Over the past 
few years, many have proposed new standards or bolt-ons to the SMTP protocol. SMTP stands 
for Simple Mail Transfer Protocol and is the way mail servers communicate with each other. 
SMTP was designed to function anonymously to guarantee the privacy of Internet users. 
Spammers have taken advantage of this aspect of email servers to send spam anonymously. 
Many fixes have been proposed, ranging from simple add-ons to complete rewrites of the 
protocol. One of the more recent proposals for fighting spam is called Sender Policy Framework 
(SPF), proposed by an organization called the Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG). 
DomainKeys (Yahoo!) and CallerID (Microsoft) [2], [3] are also the techniques in this category. 
  The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [1] is an open standard specifying a technical method 
to prevent sender address forgery. That technique is an essential front-line defense against sender 
address forgery when deploying protection for the header fields and body. Although this is a 
great idea not many organizations deployed SPF. The case in Vietnam is even worse. At the time 
this paper is written, the authors have checked some main email servers in Vietnam such as 
vnn.vn and netnam.vn but no SPF record is found. A philosophic issue, which may limit the 
deployment of SPF, is that in order to use SPF, a network administrator needs to configure local 
DNS; but others, not himself, will take benefits from that configuration. Therefore, we proposed 
the Dynamic Sender Policy Framework (DSPF) approach, in which, the legal IP addresses of 
servers which send emails are collected and provided by a third-party. The database of DSPF 
records is generated and updated automatically by using our DSPF method.  Having DSPF, user 
can query for SPF record without any extra configuration.  
This paper discusses technical issues in DSPF approach as well as generating DSPF database 
and it is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short description of SPF. Section 3 analyzes 
in detail the model for the DSPF database and our procedures for generating and updating this 
database, including some factors that may influence the performance of the database. That 
influence is discussed in the next section: experiments. A short description of DSPF in progress 
will be presented in Section 5.  Finally, we conclude and provide directions for future research. 
2. Methods Sender Policy Framework 
Sender Policy Framework (SPF), proposed by an organization called the Anti-Spam Research 
Group (ASRG). SPF is one of those brain-dead simple ideas that make people wonder why no 
one thought of it before. It defines which machines on a network are allowed to send mail. 
SPF functions as a bolt-on to the SMTP protocol that takes advantage of text records in DNS 
(records that exist for adding comments and extra information to Internet name records) and 
allows ISPs to identify “reverse MX records,” which are mail servers on their network that are 
permitted to send mail. Any host that is sending mail but is not in the permitted-from list can 
then be identified and either discarded, quarantined, or evaluated with additional scrutiny by a 
spam filter. SPF is presently in use at AOL, and many other large providers are beginning to 
follow suit. An SPF record is one line in DNS and looks like this: 
aol.com IN TXT "v=spf1 mx -all"   
The goal of SPF is not to prevent spam but to prevent forgery. In coming years, as SPF grows 
more popular, sending forged mail “from” a domain that is using SPF will become more 
difficult. Many believe that pushing the means of identifying spammers out to the domain level 
instead of the host level will make it easier to find and prosecute spammers (making it more 
difficult for spammers to operate), as they will have to register and use real domains. With new 
products like prepaid credit cards, it is relatively easy to register a domain while maintaining 
your anonymity, however. Still, it is much more difficult to move an entire domain every day 
than it is to just jump on a newly stolen dialup account. The following example explains more 
detail how SPF works. 
Suppose a spammer forges an aol.com address and tries to spam you. He connects from an IP 
address somewhere. When he declares MAIL FROM: <forged_address@aol.com>, you don't 
have to believe him. You can ask AOL if the IP address comes from their network. In this 
example, AOL publishes an SPF record. That record tells you (your computer) how to find out if 
the sending IP address belongs to them: aol.com IN TXT "v=spf1 ptr -all"  
You execute the "ptr" mechanism, which means: find out the hostname of the sending IP; if it 
ends in aol.com, it's legit. If the message fails SPF tests, it's a forgery. That's how you can tell it's 
probably a spammer. By rejecting envelope forgeries early, not only network traffic can be saved 
but also computing power for further protection measures, thus making the entire process more 
efficient [1]. By applying SPF, email’s content is not necessary. Therefore legal issues are 
avoided and the filters do not have to deal with different languages problem; A philosophic issue, 
which may limit the deployment of SPF, is that in order to use SPF, a network administrator 
needs to configure local DNS; but others, not himself, will take benefits from that configuration. 
We proposed the Dynamic Sender Policy Framework (DSPF) approach, in which, the legal IP 
addresses of servers which send emails are collected and provided by a third-party. The database 
of DSPF records is generated and updated automatically by using our DSPF method. We will 
discuss the procedure for generating DSPF database in following sections. 
3. Results Dynamic Sender Policy Framework – DSPF 
3.1. DSPF Model 
The nature of spam problem is very similar to the nature of DDOS problem where spam uses 
email forgery while DDOS uses IP spoof. An attractive idea to defense against DDOS was 
proposed by Kim [5], in which TTL of a packet is compared to the statistical value of TTL in 
packets which were sent from the same IP address in order to estimate the reliability of that IP. 
Compared to the spam problem, TTL acts as the IP address of server which sends emails. 
Based on the idea for DDOS problem, we maintain the IP addresses of servers which send 
emails in order to estimate the reliability of an email address. We call this approach “Dynamic 
SPF”. A model to generate and maintain the DSPF database is proposed as shown in “Fig. 1” 
 
Figure 1. Model for generating DSPF database 
In “Fig. 1”, email database contains up-to-date emails. The emails come from some other 
ways, including HANU anti-spam service and HANU Mail Service which receive both so many 
ham emails and spam emails from variety mail servers all over the world. As only domain name 
and its legal IP addresses are needed, using email header is enough; the content of email is not 
necessary. We developed a dynamic method to generate DSPF database automatically based on 
the email database. Since email database is up-to-date every day, the DSPF database always 
catches up with changes in IP addresses of a domain name of email servers. Even more, DSPF 
database is provided through a service which automatically provides DSPF database for email 
gateways and servers. Those users all around the world authenticate senders by conveniently 
using DSPF service in order to filter spam emails. 
Other anti-spam approaches, such as Content-based techniques (SpamAssassin, Bayesian), 
require a set of ham emails and another set of spam emails independently as sample sets for 
teaching spam filters to identify the words, headers and other text (characteristics) that stick out 
the most. As the filters analyze more message text, it’s also able to identify particular 
characteristics belonging to spam email, or ham email. In our model, generating DSPF database 
is the key process. This database is updated from a set of emails, without the spam and ham 
information. 
3.2. Generating DSPF database 
DSPF database stores the information about a domain name and its legal IP addresses. Each 
DSPF record contains two data fields, the first field is domain name and the second one keeps a 
list of IP addresses belong to the domain name. Herein, we give some examples of DSPF records 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Some examples of DSPF records 
Domain name Its IP addresses 
hanu.edu.vn 202.151.161.163 
netnam.vn 202.151.160.20, 202.151.160.23 
gmail.com 
38.98.127.148, 74.125.46.29, 74.125.46.30, 74.125.46.31, 74.125.46.152, 
74.125.46.156, 74.125.46.158, 202.151.160.20,… 
The easiest way to build up database is to contact with domain names owners, asking for the 
IP addresses of each domain name but this way seems to be an impossible mission. 
 Another way is we built the database based on the information extracted from email header. 
As explained, the Active Duration of all pairs of domain-IP address is considered in generating 
DSPF database process. We implemented a script to extract needed information in email header 
from emails database. Based on our spam/ham set, statistical figures show that 99% of spam 
servers use one domain name to send spam in the period of less than 5 days. For example, Table 
3 provides the active duration of some pairs of domain name gmail.com while Table 4 shows 
general information about the active duration of all pairs of gmail.com 
Table 2. Active duration of some pairs of gmail.com 
Domain name IP Address Active duration (days) 
gmail.com 72.14.246.241 1 
gmail.com 74.125.46.29 12 
gmail.com 202.151.160.20 22 
gmail.com 202.151.160.25 18 
gmail.com 194.44.120.190 less than 1 
Table 3. Active duration of all pairs of gmail.com 
Domain 
name 
IP Addresses 
Active duration 
(days) 
gmail.com 
38.98.127.148, 74.125.46.29, 74.125.46.30, 74.125.46.31, 
209.85.142.188, 209.85.142.189, ... 
>=3 
gmail.com 72.14.220.156 2 
gmail.com 
202.151.160.22, 38.98.127.148, 66.249.82.226, 
64.233.170.187, 72.14.220.154, 72.14.246.241 
1 
gmail.com 
219.148.11.192, 219.148.11.176, 219.148.11.184, 
219.148.11.163, 64.233.184.236, 74.125.44.29,... 
Less than 1 
 
This valuable information can be used to authenticate one sender, and generate DSPF 
database. Based on email database, we extracted information about active duration of all pairs of 
domain-IP address. The active duration (in days) of one pair is indicated from the first time to the 
last time sending mail event occurs. 
4. Experiments 
4.1. Dataset 
The email set used in this research was collected from HANU’s email server in 1 month from 
2008 June 1st to 2008 June 30th. The data set includes 7855 ham emails, 38955 spam emails, 
and 53 phishing emails to evaluate not only the performance results but also the accuracy of 
active duration of pairs domain-IP address. 
4.2. Accuracy of active duration of a pair domain-IP 
We calculated the number of pair domain-IP for each particular active duration value ranging 
from 1 day to 26 days. The result is shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen from “Fig. 2”, based on our 
spam/ham dataset, almost all pairs of spam servers have the active duration is less than 3 days 
and very few have the active duration is more than 3 days, this number decreases when the time 
increases. Meanwhile, almost all pairs of legal servers have the active duration is more than 3 
days. As a result, it is reasonable to choose 3 days as the threshold to distinguish between pairs 
of spam servers and pairs of legal servers.  
 
Figure 2. Active duration of legal domains and spam domains 
4.3. Performance 
About the evaluation criterion, we used four common parameters to evaluate our filter, FN 
(False-Negative) is the number of spam messages marked as ham; FP (False-Positive) is the 
number of ham marked as spam; TN (TrueNegative) is the number of ham marked as legitimate; 
TP (True Positive) is the number of spam messages marked as spam; SR (Spam recall); and HE 
(Ham Error). With: 
TP
SR
TP FN

  
FP
HE
TP FP

  
As proposed in Section 3, active duration is very important factor that influences the 
performance result of DSPF database or the filter. Experiment results with different values of the 
active duration threshold are as follows: 
Table 4. Active duration of all pairs of gmail.com 
Active duration threshold (days) Amount of FP Amount of FN FP (%) FN (%) 
1 2 1381 0.03 3.55 
2 6 1063 0.08 2.73 
3 11 866 0.14 2.22 
4 51 809 0.65 2.08 
5 103 760 1.31 1.95 
6 140 731 1.78 1.88 
7 189 708 2.41 1.82 
“Fig. 3” shows a spectacular result. The Spam Recall of the filter based on DSPF database is 
about 98% and the Ham Error is about 0.1% with the active duration threshold is 3-day. That 
means 3-day threshold is the best choice for the DSPF-based filter. 
 
Figure 3. Performance with different active duration thresholds 
5. DSPF in progress 
As the results from experiments above, we implemented and deployed a DSPF Plug-in for 
SpamAssassin to verify email serder addresses by querying the DSPF service 
(http://fit.hanu.vn/~anhtq/dspf). It can be easily installed in SpamAssassin. When SpamAssassin 
processes an email, the DSPF Plug-in (http://fit.hanu.vn/~anhtq/dspfplugin.html) extracts the 
domain and the IP which sent email from the email and forms a DNS query. DSPF Plug-in then 
queries the DSPF service to verify the IP is allowed to send email from the domain. The test 
results in a SpamAssassin rule. You may change the point of the rule to make it work well 
together with another rules in SpamAssassin. 
We also provide an Anti-spam POP3 Proxy (http://fit.hanu.vn/~anhtq/p3sa.html) with 
SpamAssassin and DSPF Plug-in integrated. If a user uses this Anti-spam POP3 Proxy to receive 
emails from a POP3 servers. His/her emails will go through the POP3 Proxy, in which they are 
examined by SpamAssassin before they come to the user's PC. 
6. Conclusion 
We proposed a dynamic method to generate automatically SPF records. With this method, the 
legal IP addresses of servers which send emails are collected and provided by a third-party. The 
database of SPF records can be updated automatically and can also be used among other email 
servers and email gateways. Using DSPF service, clients may check the SPF records without any 
extra configuration of their DNS. Spectacular results showed that the system is able to filter 98% 
spam and 100% phishing. For the case of DSPF, we have an experience that active duration of 
pairs domain-IP address is very important factor that influences the performance result of DSPF 
database and 3-day threshold can maintain the best database. 
In other words, maintaining DSPF database is the most important process. In this research, we 
just used active duration as the key factor for maintaining. Besides, Email Networks is a very 
interesting approach for anti-spam issue. With a provided history log of an email server, an email 
network (a graph) whose nodes are email addresses and edges are links on couples of send-
receive nodes can be constructed. P.O.Boykin and V. Roychowdhury’s research [5] has a 
remarkable result in using an email network for determining spammers at the client side. This 
approach can be applied efficiently for maintaining DSPF. Another interesting thing is this 
method is developed based on a hypothesis that all the email addresses are reliable; however, 
email address can be forged easily. Applying DSPF could be able to solve the problems. This 
issue will be focused on in our near future researches.Acknowledgements 
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